

(elease 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A0040000506014B

19 April 1963

OCI No. 0276/63 Copy No. 75

WEEKLY SUMMARY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER

IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE

JOB 7c BOX

GROUP I Excluded from automatic

downgrading and declassification

NGA Review Complete

25X1

40- 228524/



CONTENTS

(Information as of 1200 EST, 18 April 1963)

	CUBA	Page
T a	FORCES IN CUBA There continues to be evidence that some Cubans are being trained in the operation of weapons systems previously considered wholly Soviet manned.	1
T: g:	S IN CUBA'S ECONOMIC CONTROL APPARATUS The regime is establishing new controls and reor- ganizing existing regulatory institutions in ef- orts to prevent further economic deterioration.	2
T) pr o:	EXILE GROUPS Three groups have joined forces "for action ourposes," and another has announced the beginning of a campaign looking toward an eventual insurection in Cuba.	3
	THE COMMUNIST WORLD	
II tl	MS IN THE TOP SOVIET LEADERSHIP ndications continue that Khrushchev has been on he defensive on some controversial issues and that is detractors within the party are growing bolder.	4
Pr cc he tl er	OZLOV'S STATUS IN THE SOVIET HIERARCHY resumed heir-apparent Kozlov is the subject of onflicting rumors in Moscow, some holding that e and Khrushchev are at odds, others asserting hat Khrushchev is about to transfer party or gov-rnment leadership to him. (Published separately s Special Report OCI No. 0276/63B)	
Th re	CHEDULES PLENUM ON INTELLECTUAL NONCONFORMITY he 28 May central committee meeting will be the egime's fourth major effort since December to ring party-enforced order to intellectual life.	6
Mo ab ti	NTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL AIR ROUTES oscow and Prague continue to expand air routes broad, undoubtedly motivated more by considerations of bloc prestige in underdeveloped areas han by expectations of profitable operations.	8

THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued)	age
YUGOSLAV POWER STRUCTURE CHANGING The changes will disperse political functions more widely and substantially reduce the influence of the party's more conservative element.	10
MILITIA INCREASINGLY ACTIVE IN COMMUNIST CHINA Much of the activity appears to be concentrated in strategic border areas.	12
ASIA-AFRICA	
SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER IN INDONESIA AND BURMA Despite signs of coolness between Malinovsky and the Indonesians, his visit apparently resulted in agree- ment to negotiate further military aid; there is no evidence of any similar results in Burma.	13
CRISIS ATMOSPHERE PERSISTS IN LAOS The neutralists' confrontation with the Pathet Lao is broadening, as is their collaboration with right- ist forces; Premier Souvanna's plans for new nego- tiations face serious obstacles.	14
NEPAL'S KING BEGINS NEW POLITICAL EXPERIMENT He is trying again to win broader support for his essentially one-man rule, but many politicians re- gard his new system of elected councils as a sham.	15
EGYPT, SYRIA, AND IRAQ FORM NEW FEDERATION The union will remain for some time more a symbol than a working organization, but it gives the radical Arab nationalists a new advantage in their campaign against conservative Arab regimes and increases Israeli apprehensions.	16
CONGO CABINET RESHUFFLED The new government appears to be moderate and pro- Western, but Premier Adoula may still have trouble with Parliament despite concessions he has promised.	17
TOGO POLITICIANS REACH TEMPORARY AGREEMENT Elections now may be held on schedule on 5 May, with Grunitsky the only candidate for president.	18

SECRET

19 Apr 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Page ii

ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page 19 RHODESIA-NYASALAND FEDERATION NEAR DISSOLUTION London now says Northern Rhodesia may secede; whitecontrolled Southern Rhodesia is demanding independence no later than the African-dominated territories. THE SOUTH-WEST AFRICA ISSUE IN THE UNITED NATIONS South Africa continues to govern adjacent South-West Africa under a League of Nations mandate and refuses to allow the UN a voice in the territory's administration. (Published separately as Special Report OCI No. 0276/63A) **EUROPE** NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN ITALY 20 The results will probably favor continuation of the present center-left government backed in Parliament by the Nenni Socialists. WESTERN HEMISPHERE 21 PROSPECT OF INCREASED POLISH-MEXICAN TRADE Poland's efforts to translate improved political relations into substantial trade may fail as a result of rightist pressures in anticipation of Mexico's 1964 presidential election. THE POSTCOUP SITUATION IN GUATEMALA 22 The military regime defends its stringent antisubversive decrees as necessary to restore order.

25X1

25X1

SECRET

BOLIVIAN PRESIDENT MOVING TO CURB LEFTWARD DRIFT

avoid jeopardizing continued US aid.

Paz appears to have adopted a harder line toward domestic leftists and toward Castro in order to

23

Cuba

SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA

The one Soviet passenger ship to arrive in Havana during the past week carried no known passengers. No other Soviet passenger vessels are now en route to Cuba.

the Soviet dry-cargo ship Sovetskaya Gavan, photographed en route from Havana to the Cuban port of Caibarien, was armed with two four-barreled antiaircraft heavy machine guns. This is the first evidence of the arming of a Soviet merchant vessel in response to the anti-Castro exile raids.

Evidence continues to be received that some Cubans are being trained in the operation of weapons systems previously considered to be wholly Soviet manned∫

The possible surface-toair missile (SAM) training site at Managua was activated during the past week. Equipment apparently came from the Havana site which was evacuated during the same period.

The recent shift of Komar missile crates from the Mariel Naval Air Station to a new installation at Cabanas

may be in preparation for a turnover of Komar boats to Cuban personnel and their redeployment from Mariel to Cabanas.

Some changes in the disposition of the possible Cuban encampments at or near the four Soviet armored camps and an increase in activity including tank and vehicle driver training at these installations further suggest that Cubans are training in the operation of Soviet ground weapons. Encampments consisting of tents not normally used by Soviet forces are now within or adjacent to all four of the Soviet armored camps in Cuba.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/12/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004000050001-4

SECRET

Cuba

CHANGES IN CUBA'S ECONOMIC CONTROL APPARATUS

The Castro regime is establishing new controls and recorganizing existing regulatory institutions in its efforts to prevent further deterioration in the domestic economy. Additional measures along these lines probably will be taken later in 1963.

All essential goods and services were placed under price controls on 4 April, and prices and profits of both state-owned and private enterprises henceforth are to be set by the government. There is no indication of the margin of profit to be allowed private firms, which are steadily decreasing in number and are already subject to heavy taxation.

There is nothing to suggest that the new price controls will be balanced by increased supplies of scarce consumer goods. Without expanded stocks of such items, the imposition of price controls could backfire and worsen the economic situation by increasing the pressures for black-market transactions and decreasing workers' incentives to earn higher wages by increasing their production.

On 9 April Minister of Interior Trade Manuel Luzardo publicly stated that provincial supply control offices will replace the local committees which heretofore have administered the consumer goods supply and distribution systems. Food and clothing items henceforth will reach the working people first, he declared, and the "bourgeoisie, lumpen, loafers, and parasites" from now on will have "no privileges" in the distribution of such items.

25X1

Cuba

CUBAN EXILE GROUPS

The controversy over Dr. Jose Miro Cardona's resignation from leadership of the Cuban Revolutionary Council has tended to obscure several other recent significant developments in the Cuban exile community.

Representatives of the Peoples Revolutionary Movement (MRP) voted in a Miami convention on 13 April to join forces "for action purposes" with two other exile groups, Alpha-66 and the Second National Front of the Escambray. The latter two groups, which had already reached a considerable degree of unity, have been among the most active in mounting commando raids and were responsible for the 17 March attack on the Soviet vessel L'gov.

In announcing the unity move, the three groups called on other exile organizations to join with them.

The MRP convention pledged action toward Cuban liberation "with efforts of Cubans themselves and with the support of democratic nations of the Free World." An MRP spokesman subsequently declared that "we want to make real war on Castro, not

only hit-and-run war, but guerrilla and invasion war."

Another anti-Castro group, the Revolutionary Junta (JURE), announced on 13 April that it has launched its campaign to infiltrate the Castro regime with the objective of ultimately bringing about armed insurrection. The statement declared that JURE's program does not come into conflict with US laws since its activities are carried out "solely within Cuba."

JURE is led by Manuel Ray, a former Castro cabinet officer who broke with the Cuban leader in 1959. Ray, who claims close contact with such reformist Latin American leaders as President Betancourt of Venezuela, is convinced that the brunt of the anti-Castro fight must be borne by Cubans inside Cuba and that an internal uprising can be stimulated.

25X1

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Page 3

19 Apr 63

25X1

The Communist World

PROBLEMS IN THE TOP SOVIET LEADERSHIP

There continues to be indications that Khrushchev has been on the defensive on some controversial issues and that his detractors within the party are growing bolder. The extent, if any, to which his political control has been affected remains unclear, however, and the differences do not yet appear serious enough to impair the normal functioning of the government.

The treatment of the Soviet May Day slogan on Yugoslavia seemed to lend substance to the recent spate of rumors about troubles in the Kremlin. When the slogan was first published on 8 April, it made no reference to "building socialism." On 11 April, however, Yugoslavia was moved into the category of countries "building socialism" and was thus ranked equally with all other Communist bloc countries, including China and Albania. The change was obviously aimed at Peiping and emphasized that Khrushchev and his followers will not modify their doctrinal position that Yugoslavia is "socialist" -- a fundamental point of contention in the Sino-Soviet polemic.

The original omission suggests a difference of opinion on this question which

resulted in the use of the same formula concerning Yugoslavia which has been employed since 1958. Alternatively, the original slogan may have been published at the instigation of some leaders who saw in Khrushchev's absence on vacation an opportunity to indicate their disagreement with some of his views.

Recent signs that former Defense Minister Zhukov may soon be rehabilitated also suggest political maneuvering. Discussions of his past role began to vary in February, and several military articles have since mentioned his wartime contributions in a favorable context. Most authors, however, have reiterated charges that Zhukov committed military blunders and followed an "antiparty" line during his tenure as defense minister. That some alteration in Zhukov's official status may be impending was further suggested when a Soviet military protocol officer recently appeared to be angling for an invitation to Zhukov to the US Armed Forces' Day celebration on 21 May. Zhukov has not been invited in recent years, but the omission of his name has never previously evoked Soviet comment.

The Communist World

Any degree of restoration of respectability for Zhukov would have a political motivation. His removal as defense minister and as a member of the party presidium in 1957 was clearly engineered by Khrushchev, that he had charged sought to gain the independence of the military from party con-Thus, Zhukov's public trol. re-emergence would be viewed as an indication of increased influence for the professional soldier as opposed to the party, political military leaders, and his return to even partial favor would reflect adversely on Khrushchev.

Other recent straws in the wind which suggest jockeying for position by Khrushchev's sub-ordinates include an implied criticism in the press of presidium member Aleksey Kirilenko—long a Khrushchev associate—for his performance as Sverdlovsk Oblast party boss during 1955—1962, and a slight momentary downgrading of his name in the usually alphabetical press listing of the presidium.

Despite these various signs of stress, Khrushchev has continued to receive prominent attention in the press. Throughout the time he has been away

from Moscow, he has been sent numerous adulatory greetings from various meetings through—out the country, and his state—ments have been liberally quoted. There have also been references to the party presidium "headed by Khrushchev." Although no such position as "head" of the presidium formally exists, the formulation is not unusual and its use conveys to the party faithful that Khrushchev is indeed the leader.

That there is an opposition to Khrushchev seems undeniable nevertheless, and it may be asserting itself sufficiently to make the situation intolerable from his standpoint. past behavior would indicate that he will not stand idly by while his opponents gather strength. He will probably return to Moscow within the next few days, and may at that time attempt a decisive display of his authority perhaps in the form of a new policy statement, further top-level personnel changes, or both. It is possible, however, that the balance of forces within the leadership is now so fine that he will find it politically inexpedient to force a showdown at this time and may therefore have no other choice than to temporize.

The Communist World

USSR SCHEDULES PLENUM ON INTELLECTUAL NONCONFORMITY

The central committee plenum scheduled for 28 May on "current tasks of ideological work" will be the first during Khrushchev's tenure to be devoted exclusively to ideological matters and will be the regime's fourth major effort since December to bring partyenforced order into Soviet intellectual life. The session will be attended by leaders in the creative arts, science, and education.

Pressure by the regime to force the intellectuals back into line is continuing. A series of regional meetings on ideology and the recently con-

cluded Artists' Congress have been utilized for harsh attacks on individual writers and artists. Trips abroad for the liberal intellectuals have apparently been forbidden--Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, for instance, has canceled previously scheduled trips to Italy and the United States on grounds of "ill health." A demand for his expulsion from the Writers' Union was voiced by four conservative colleagues this week, and an article in Izvestia on 3 April attempted to implicate Yevtushenko, poet Bulat Okudzhava, and sculptor Ernst Neizvestny in black-market activities.

The regime's disciplinary efforts have had little success thus far. No prominent liberal or moderate writer has made an unqualified recantation and a few are apparently actively rebutting charges against them. The partial "confessions" extracted have been so worded as to sound obviously insincere. The majority, including such formerly stalwart conservatives as Aleksey Surkov and Boris Polevoy who are themselves now under attack, have remained silent.

SECRET

63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Page 6

The Communist World

In addition to bringing the full weight of central committee authority to focus on the problem of recalcitrant intellectuals, the coming plenum may also be used to merge the three professional cultural unions--for writers, artists, and composers. Party Secretary Leonid Ilichev, who was appointed chairman of the central committee's commission on ideology last November, is to deliver the main report to the The message from the plenum. central committee which he delivered to the Artists' Congress last week called on artists to "unite" with writers, architects, composers, and workers in the theater and motion pictures. The congress keynote speaker echoed the need for unification which had earlier been heard from such leading conservative writers as Vsevelod Kochetov and Aleksandr Chakovsky.

There has also been a report that a new state committee is to be established to supervise all publishing and press activities, to be headed by Khrushchev's son-in-law, Aleksey Adzhubey.

These measures for centralization of authority may enable the regime to establish a tighter censorship over publication or exhibition of nonconformist workers. They will, however, tend to confirm Soviet intellectuals in the current "conspiracy of silence" of which Ilichev complained in March. Positive contributions to building communism from the recalcitrant intellectuals may be attainable only through an open resort to physical coercion, a step which the party is apparently not yet prepared to take.

25X1

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Page 7


The Communist World

BLOC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL AIR ROUTES

The USSR and Czechoslovakia -- the bloc countries most active in international civil aviation--continue their drive to expand their air routes abroad. Primary interest is in the acquisition of new routes in Africa, but new air agreements with several Middle Eastern countries may presage an increase in bloc service to that area. Although these routes may not always be economically profitable, the bloc undoubtedly views the expansion of its international air networks as a means of developing its prestige in the underdeveloped areas.

The USSR in recent months has resumed negotiations with

African countries with a view to developing routes outlined in the Soviet-Sudanese air agreement concluded last July. Under that agreement the Soviet airline, Aeroflot, proposed to inaugurate service linking Khartoum with Lagos, Accra, Conakry, Bamako, and Rabat, and with points in Ethiopia, the Somali Republic, Kenya, Tanganyika, and the Malagasy Republic. While regular Aeroflot service to Khartoum was begun last July, Moscow has still to obtain overflight and landing rights from key intermediary countries in order to extend this service to other points in Africa.



The Communist World

If an air agreement is reached with the Somali Republic to enable the USSR to extend its Khartoum flights to Mogadiscio-as now seems likely--Moscow probably will press its request made late last year for similar rights in Ethiopa. It also has asked for overflight rights from both Nigeria and Chad in connection with its proposed West African route. At present Aeroflot flies on the circuitous route from Moscow to Belgrade, Rabat, Conakry, and Accra.

The USSR concluded air agreements with Syria and Iraq last December, but regular service—originally scheduled to start last month—has not yet begun. Moscow has reopened its prolonged and difficult negoti—ations with Japan for an air agreement; a six—man delegation from Japan Air Lines went to the USSR in March to conduct a technical survey on the possibilities

of regular air service between the two capitals.

Czechoslovakia has concluded new air agreements with Afghanistan, Turkey, and Tunisia, and a draft agreement with the Sudan has been initialed. The Czech airline (CSA) in the near future will probably add Kabul to its present Middle Eastern flight. Czech proposals to inaugurate a Prague-Tunis-Accra-Lagos route may, however, encounter difficulties. Although CSA was issued a provisional license last summer by Nigeria to operate such a route, it still lacks overflight rights for some intermediate points--probably Algeria and Upper Volta. addition, a Tunisian official has denied that his country's air agreement with Czechoslovakia granted CSA rights to fly beyond Tunis, stating that such rights would require further negotiations.

25X1

The Communist World

YUGOSLAV POWER STRUCTURE CHANGING

In connection with the adoption of a new constitution and the calling of national elections, the Tito regime announced on 6 and 7 April basic policy changes which will further alter the Yugoslav power structure. Political power will be more widely dispersed, and the influence of the more conservative element will probably be substantially reduced. Typical of Belgrade's willingness to experiment, these changes are the latest in a series, begun in January, which, in one way or another, will soon affect the regime from top to bot-

Aleksander Rankovic, Tito's foremost deputy, has unveiled a new retirement plan for bureaucrats. He presented the plan in as favorable a light as possible by claiming that those retired will be able to continue political activity "as much as their health and other circumstances allow." In fact, however, the regime will probably use it primarily against local bosses, many of whom have few qualifications other than service with Tito's partisans and who resist change as a threat to their personal positions.

The partisan clique still wields considerable power, however, and Belgrade may encounter difficulties. When the leadership announced in early March, for example, that Yugoslavia's flag would be changed to a red banner with a superimposed triangle of the national colors--eliminating the partisan star -- it encountered immediate and strong opposition. Six weeks later it reversed itself.

Rankovic and Edvard Kardelj, the regime's leading ideologist, have both ordered a significant expansion of Parliament's role



630415 5

25X1

in policy making. Belgrade now apparently wants Parliament to examine the efficacy of regime proposals and

even to initiate policy to some extent. Members of the Parliament. which henceforth will sit in continuous session, will be required to relinquish all other duties.

Yugoslavia's trade unions are


also being shaken up. On 20 March. over half the membership of the presidential council and secretariat of the central trade unions organization was changed. Meetings now being held will merge the 14-member unions into six. Belgrade hopes that the unions, short of funds and able personnel, will be able through these economies to improve their performance as maintainers of labor discipline. It also intends to give union leaders a greater voice in determin-

SECRET

ing labor policy.

19 Apr 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



The Communist World

MILITIA INCREASINGLY ACTIVE IN COMMUNIST CHINA

The Chinese Communists are giving increasing attention to the militia forces—"the armed organization of the people." Following a surge of fairly intensive effort in 1959 to strengthen this 200-million-man quasi-military force, it had lapsed into comparative inactivity and little was heard of it until recently.

Much of the activity appears to be concentrated near the southeast China coast where it doubtless in part reflects sensitivity to the threat of Chinese Nationalist infiltration. Last summer, Peiping was reportedly concerned over the possibility that its regular armed forces might not be adequate to defend border regions should China become engaged against several major foreign enemies at once.

Peiping presumably is also strengthening militia units near the Sinklang frontier with the USSR, where armed dissidence was reported last year. A recent military conference in this area, the first announced in some time, called for a step-up in local military training.

Peiping may use its militia to assist in checking "antiso-cialist" practices among the peasantry. A vigorous crackdown, accompanied by arrests and corporal punishment, has been under way in the Swatow-Amoy area during the past month against speculators and black-marketeers, among others.

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET

19 Apr 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Page 12

Asia-Africa

NEPAL'S KING BEGINS NEW POLITICAL EXPERIMENT

King Mahendra has inaugurated a new constitutional experiment in Nepal with much fanfare but amid growing doubt and uncertainty among politically conscious elements.

The experiment is one in "panchayat democracy," a pyramid of indirectly elected councils having its roots in Hindu tradition but resembling also Pakistan's "basic democracies" scheme. The National Panchayat, which met for the first time on 14 April, is intended to be the "legislative" apex of the system.

Mahendra's last "democratic experiment" ended in 1960 when, feeling that he was losing authority to the politicians, he threw out the European-style parliamentary government he had authorized the year before and reverted to one-man rule. His new system preserves his power but cloaks it with constitutional arrangements.

Mahendra has also established a Raj Sabha (Council of State), to which he has appointed politicians, civil and military officials, and members of the royal family. He seems to envisage this group as a Britishstyle privy council, but with expanded advisory functions. In

making appointments to it, he has sought to pay off debts, buy off troublemakers, and generate broader support.

Several politicians, however, seem determined to resist the King's lures and to become more vocal in their criticism of him. Only 56 of his 69 appointees to the Raj Sabha have come forward to be sworn in. While some are moved by petty considerations of prestige, there is strong suspicion among many politicians that they would be doing no more than going through the motions if they participated in the new system. Party activities continue to be banned, several influential politicians remain in jail, and the sessions of the National Panchayat are closed to the public.

The King's internal position remains strong, and his new system even has the support of the Communist Party's moderate wing. However, even this carefully controlled experiment has given Katmandu its first political stir in 28 months, and expressions of discontent have been heard which the King will have trouble countering without confirming suspicions that the whole operation is a sham.

25X1

Asia-Africa

EGYPT, SYRIA, AND IRAQ FORM NEW FEDERATION

The new federation agreement signed in Cairo on 17 April by representatives of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq will give these governments another substantial advantage in their campaign against the remaining conservative regimes in the Arab Near East. For some time, however, the federation will remain much more a magnetic symbol of longstanding Arab aspirations than an operating organization.

The federal proclamation provides for a central executive -- almost certainly Nasir himself -- to be chosen in the initial instance by popular plebiscite but subsequently by a two-house federal legislature. The members of the federation, however, will retain their own presidents and legislatures. Contrary to impressions given by some of the announcements from Cairo. the approach to full federation is to be gradual, with only a few consultative institutions at the outset. A constitution is to be drafted by a special committee during the next few months. The next major step is the plebiscite, which is to be held before 17 September, to approve the constitution as well as to choose the president.

The sharpest reaction to the new federation will almost certainly come from Israel, which has long been apprehensive that its Arab neighbors would The clear intention of the new federation's leaders to press for the eventual adherence of Jordan--by revolution if necessary--adds to Israel's concern. While hoping that internal stresses among the federal states and, within them, between Nasirists and independent -minded socialist Baathists will vitiate the new structure, the Israeli leaders are likely to put renewed emphasis on their development programs in the nuclear and missile fields.

The position of Yemen, whose leaders are extremely anxious to adhere to the federation, is unclear. It seems doubtful that the other Arab leaders wish to give the turbulent, backward Yemenis much of a role. In the case of Algeria, however, the Cairo negotiators have gone out of their way to make room for the principal North African Arab state, while indications are that Algerian Premier Ben Bella does not intend any early move toward affiliation. The Lebanese Government, with its delicate balance of influence between Christians and Moslems, will probably find its situation complicated by pressures from its militant Moslems to affiliate in some way.

25X1

Asia-Africa

CONGO CABINET RESHUFFLED

The composition of Congolese Premier Adoula's reshuffled cabinet indicates that the government will remain moderate and pro-Western. Adoula has made few concessions to Congolese radicals, seeking instead to win over Tshombé's Katangan followers and members of the ABAKO, the party of the important Bakongo tribe in Leopoldville Province. The changes make Adoula's position somewhat stronger, but still do not give him control of Parliament/

Tshombé's supporters, now represented for the first time, won a vice premiership, two economic ministries, and the new post of vice foreign minister. ABAKO acquired the key Ministry of Interior in addition to the three posts it previously held. The strong Katangan and ABAKO position within the government, however, may eventually prove to be a source of trouble for Adoula.

The Lumumbists won a vice premiership, but the appointee is a moderate, and only one or possibly two of the four other Lumumbist ministers can be classified as radicals.

Adoula's principal concessions are changes in the foreign and interior ministries, and a promise to release the leftist leader Antoine Gizenga. Ex - Foreign Minister Bomboko and ex - Interior Minister Kamitatu are still in the cabinet, however, and Adoula says he will move Bomboko back to the Foreign Ministry once Parliament is recessed. The "interim" foreign minister, Auguste Kalanda-Mabita, is a nonparty moderate and one of the Congo's few university graduates.

In Elisabethville, mean-while, Tshombé's provincial government has been under surprisingly strong attack by the Katanga assembly, which has censured three of his ministers and threatens to move against two others. Tribal animosities broke out in fighting at Jadotville on 12 April, and later also at Kolwezi, but the situation apparently has been brought under control by UN forces.

25X1

25×1

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Page 17

19 Apr 63

Asia-Africa

TOGO POLITICIANS REACH TEMPORARY AGREEMENT

After some ten days of political turmoil and confusion, Togolese political groups and the leaders of the junta apparently have reached a modus vivendi which will permit elections to be held as scheduled on 5 May.

The latest phase of political upheaval in Lomé was set off on 8-9 April by the arrest of Interior Minister Kutuklui and other leaders of the late President Olympio's Togolese Unity (UT) party. Provisional President Grunitsky took action after acquiring firm new evidence that these UT elements were involved with exiled party leaders in planning a countercoup supported by Guinea, Liberia, and Nigeria.

Finance Minister Meatchi
and junta chief Bodjolle--both
militant northern Togolese-seized on the opportunity to
try to crush the southernbased UT and ensure the supremacy of northern elements by
replacing Grunitsky with Meatchi.
On 13 April they pressed Grunitsky
to withdraw his candidacy for
the presidency, saying they could
not support him because he had
dealt too leniently with the
plotters.

Within hours, however, Bodjolle reversed his position and offered Grunitsky his support against

Meatchi. At a meeting with Grunitsky the next day--attended by Meatchi, Bodjolle, and all political elements except the UT, which missed the meeting because of internal confusion--agreement was reached to support Grunitsky for president and Meatchi for vice president. Both candidates accepted, although on 16 April, the deadline for filing electoral lists, Meatchi made another unsuccessful bid for the top spot.

Grunitsky's victory in this struggle paved the way for the filing of a single list in which the 56 assembly seats were divided equally among Togo's four parties. With most of its national leaders out of circulation, the UT slate was presented by old-line tribal elements of the party and others hostile to the Kutuklui faction.

Participation in the election by at least this portion of the UT would appear to be essential if a new Togolese government is to obtain recognition by other African states. Nigeria, a key country in this connection, may be softening its earlier strong opposition to recognition of the Grunitsky regime

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000050001-4

19 Apr 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Page 18

25X1

Asia-Africa

RHODESIA-NYASALAND FEDERATION NEAR DISSOLUTION

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is on its last legs. With African-dominated governments established in both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, London in late March acknowledged Northern Rhodesia's right to secede from the federation and, by implication, eventually to become independent. This right had been conceded to Nyasaland last December.

The announcement on Northern Rhodesia triggered a demand from Southern Rhodesia, a whitedominated colony which has been virtually autonomous on internal matters for 40 years, that it be granted full independence no later than either of the other territories. However, to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia at the same time as Nyasaland--which may receive independence late in 1964--would run counter to the British tradition of retaining control of its colonial territories until the majority of the inhabitants are participating in the government. On the other hand, to refuse outright would have stimulated strong criticism from right-wing Conservatives in Britain and possibly a unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia.

Central African Secretary
Butler's reaction has therefore been to play for time.
He has acknowledged in principle
Southern Rhodesia's right to
independence, but said that no
decisions could be made until
the long and complicated process of dismantling the federation is complete. Butler's

reply also asserted Britain's right to legislate for the federation "and so indirectly with regard to Southern Rhodesia"—an implicit suggestion that London may intend to reassume the federal powers, which include defense, foreign trade, and finance, rather than hand them to the constituent territories when the federation is abolished.

The next formal step is likely to be a conference, perhaps by mid-1963, to begin the unscrambling of the federal relationships. Southern Rhodesia, which has the greatest stake in the federal economy, would be foolish to boycott these talks, and Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Field may well back away from threats he has made to this effect.

In any event, more trouble appears ahead. Removal of the federal superstructure will expose Southern Rhodesia's racial problems to even more direct and intense international attention, and the British will be under greater pressure to intervene on behalf of the colony's three million Africans. Moreover, Southern Rhodesian African nationalist leaders recently made a mass exodus to Tanganyika. While the Tanganyika Government can be expected to restrain them for the time being, they can easily set up a government-in-exile as well as encourage the activities of nationalist saboteurs, who allegedly have been undergoing training in Tanganyika./

25X1

PARTY STRENGTHS IN THE ITALIAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES FOLLOWING THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS OF 1948, 1953, AND 1958

	1948 Deputies		1953 Deputies		1958 Deputies	
N	UMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT
Christian Democrats	304	53.1	262	44.4	273	45.8
Social Democrats	33	5.8	19	3.2	22	3.8
Republicans	9	1.6	5	8.0	6	1.0
National Bloc*	19	3.3				
Liberals			14	2.5	17	2.9
Communists			143	24.2	140	23.5
Socialists	183°	31.9	75	12.7	84	14.1
Monarchists	14	2.4	40	6.8	25	4.1
Neo-Fascists	6	1.0	29	4.9	24	4.0
Other	5	0.9	3	0.5	5	8.0

 $[\]mbox{\ensuremath{}^{a}}$ A combination made up largely of the Liberals and the National Reconstruction Union.

Popular Democratic Front of Communists and Socialists.

Europe

NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN ITALY

Results of Italy's national elections on 28 and 29 April will probably favor continuation of Amintore Fanfani's center-left government--backed in Parliament by Pietro Nenni's Italian Socialist Party--despite expected losses by Fanfani's Christian Democrats. The small Social Democratic Party is expected to gain heavily from its role as principal architect of the center-left formula. Republican Party, the Christian Democrats' other cabinet partner, will remain negligible in strength despite the increased prominence of Republican Budget Minister La Malfa. Most observers feel the Nenni Socialists will be lucky to hold their own.

The three cabinet parties and their Socialist allies have toned down the mutual recriminations which marked the earlier weeks of the election campaign. Both Fanfani and Christian Democratic Party Secretary Moro have urged voters who do not choose to support the major party to back its allies, including the Nenni Socialists.

Besides Fanfani's "opening to the left," another new factor in this campaign is Italy's "economic miracle" which had not fully developed at the time of the last national elections (1958) and for which both Christian Democrats and Communists claim credit. Another development is the move to the right by the already conservative Liberal Party, which is bitterly attacking the Christian Democrats, and is expected to show a substantial gain over its 3.4-percent share of the 1958 vote.

Moro, however, has reiterated his party's stand against any alliance with the right, specifically with the Liberals. Even ex-premier Scelba, who had earlier reportedly urged a "clean center-left" including the present cabinet parties but excluding the Nenni Socialists, said last week: "it is more important to bring the Socialists into the democratic camp than to collaborate with the Liberals."

Conflict between the once allied Communists and Socialists is sharpening. The Socialist daily, Avanti!, has been featuring a series headlined "An Alternative Which Does Not Exist" which attacks the Communists' claim to represent an alternative to what they call the "phony center-left" exemplified by the present govern-The Socialists have also sought to embarrass the Communists by criticizing the Soviet cultural crackdown and exploiting reports of discord within the Kremlin. Nevertheless, the Communists, with a party organization superior to that of the Socialists, will probably at least maintain their present strength. They are working especially hard to draw votes from Socialists opposed to Nenni's "opening to the right."

As for other parties, the neo-Fascists will probably hold their own, and the expected collapse of the monarchists should help the Liberals and Christian Democrats. The Adzhubey audience and the latest papal encyclical are expected to have liteleffect on the voting.

25X1

Western Hemisphere

PROSPECT OF INCREASED POLISH-MEXICAN TRADE

Poland's diligent efforts over the past several years to establish closer relations with Mexico appear to be producing Carefully cosome results. ordinated communiqués published after each of the recent visits by Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz and Mexican President Lopez Mateos imply Mexican "understanding" of Polish foreign policy positions and seem to signal the diminishing of official Mexican resistance to closer trade and economic relations with Poland.

During Lopez Mateos' 1-3 April stay in Warsaw, the Mexican minister of industry and commerce met with top Polish foreign trade and economic officials. These talks resulted in agreement to create a mixed trade commission and to exchange trade missions within the shortest possible time. The most promising trade possiblity is the sale of Mexico's surplus cotton to Poland, but unsatisfactory past experience with bloc goods and equipment will make Mexican negotiators wary.

All of this activity is in sharp contrast to the re-Only last October cent past. the then-new Polish ambassador to Mexico--chosen from among the highest ranking Foreign Ministry officials--offered credits and technical assistance for development of ten large fishing ports, and was politely rejected. Trade turnover in 1962 apparently was too small to be included in Warsaw's published statistics, and in 1961 it amounted to only \$300,000, reflecting a steady decline from a high of \$2 million in 1956.

Polish attempts to woo Mexico have foundered on the rocks of Mexican politics before. The apparent easing of Mexican resistance to Poland's economic entry into the country may be slowed by preparations for Mexico's presidential elections in 1964, during which rightist groups may demand less cooperation with the bloc in exchange for political cooperation at home.

25X1

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Page 21

Western Hemisphere

THE POSTCOUP SITUATION IN GUATEMALA

Almost half the other Latin American countries have "resumed relations" with Guatemala, in most instances on the grounds that the military government which seized power on 30 March appears to be in effective control of the Several other councountry. tries appear ready to resume contacts for the same reason, but some half dozen governments are holding back on principle, as in the case of Venezuela, or because they fear, as in Ecuador, that their own armed forces may be considering a takeover.

Colonel Enrique Peralta, serving both as chief of state and of the armed force in Guatemala, on 15 April defended the stringency of his government's recent "Charter of Government" and its failure to name a specific date for elections. He feels that he is publicly committed to holding elections within two years, but says he does not want to state this in a decree because it would generate the same kind of disruptive political activity which preceded the coup. He stressed the determination of the armed forces to clean up the Guatemalan Government and avoid the possibility of an extremist takeover. He said he believes the Guatemalan people support his program.

Peralta's brother, a legal consultant to the government, has justified the severity of a new antisupversive law, which gives military courts jurisdiction over charges of subversion, on the grounds that so many civil judges are so sympathetic to ex-president Juan Arevalo that they could not be depended upon to enforce the law. The Peralta coup had been touched off by Arevalo's clandestine return to Guatemala. Now back in Mexico City exile, Arevalo eluded capture during his ten-day stay in Guatemala, both before and after the coup.

Arevalo--distrusted by top military officers because of the laxity toward Communists which characterized his 1945-51 administration--seems confident that he will be able to make a political comeback. Although the stiff government decree may deter an early return to Guatemala, his success in getting in and out of the country this last time probably convinced him that he can rely on his supporters in Guatemala for information and protection in the future.

25X1

Western Hemisphere


BOLIVIAN PRESIDENT MOVING TO CURB LEFTWARD DRIFT

Bolivian President Paz Estenssoro apparently has adopted a harder line toward domestic leftist extremists and may be considering moves hostile to Castro in an effort to win favor in the US. Paz is seeking to consolidate recent political gains at the expense of leftwing supporters of his rival, Vice President Juan Lechin, and plans an early visit to the US.

Since Bolivia's sweeping economic and social revolution in 1952, Paz' critics have sometimes termed his domestic and foreign policies "quasi-Communist" and "proneutralist." Since the first of the year, however, the government has taken some steps to curb the influence of extreme leftists.



JUAN LECHIN



PAZ

La Nacion, the government's newspaper, frequently has editorialized against the PCB and the threat of left-wing extremism in Bolivia.

25X1

25X1

The government reportedly has published a decree prohibiting a Czechoslovak firm from continuing to import Skoda trucks. Despite considerable domestic criticism of its stand, the government has also continued to delay acceptance of an attractive Czech offer to build an antimony smelter in Bolivia.

Bolivia at the same time is displaying a more moderate attitude toward the US. La Paz reacted calmly to a recent US arrangement to begin sales of stockpiled tin. A similar US move during the summer of 1962 so antagonized Paz that he canceled a scheduled trip to the US.

In contrast to other years, no

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Page 23

19 Apr 63

Western Hemisphere

anti-American or proleftist demonstrations were observed at the 9 April celebration commemorating the anniversary of the 1952 revolution.

Indicative of a shift in the Paz government's hitherto permissive policy toward Cuba was its cancellation of a meeting in La Paz of a Havanabacked hemisphere labor confederation. The announcement of this decision stressed the government's determination to prevent "international Communism from gaining a foothold in Bolivian labor." The effect of this statement, however, is primarily rhetorical since the Bolivian labor movement for years has been the stronghold of left-wing extremists and has been thoroughly penetrated by the PCB.

Bolivia may also be considering alternatives to its present policy of maintaining normal diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Paz' new moderation can be attributed in part to his success in strengthening his political position in Bolivia's dominant party, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) at the expense of the MNR left wing, which Lechin heads. In March, Paz was successful in controlling the national congress of the politically important national peasants' organization and in obtaining its endorsement as a candidate for the 1964 elections. Previously, political strength in that organization had been about evenly divided between Paz and Lechin.

Lechin, who since December 1962 has been Bolivia's ambassador to Italy, as well as its vice president, has just returned to La Paz on a surprise visit. If Lechin's stay is prolonged Paz may postpone his trip to Washington—tenatively scheduled for the end of May—particularly if he thinks Lechin is trying to attract political support away from him.

Paz is very much interested in visiting the US, however. His ambitious ten-year plan for economic and social development is founded financially on the Alliance for Progress, and he presumably wishes to avoid jeopardizing continued US aid. It is therefore possible that his recent policy shifts are more than window dressing and will endure.

25X1 25X1

SECRET



Asia-Africa

SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER IN INDONESIA AND BURMA

Despite an atmosphere of marked coolness between Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky and his Indonesian hosts, the visit apparently resulted in agreement in principle to negotiate further military assistance.

Djakarta announced on 9 April that a military delegation will go to Moscow as a "followup" to the Malinovsky visit. Indonesia wants spare parts and assistance in producing its own weapons. Also, Air Marshal Dani has been quoted by a Djakarta newspaper as having said that Indonesia will soon receive surface-to-surface missiles. No such agreement has been reported, but missiles--probably shortrange tactical models--may have been discussed in connection with a new arms deal involving additional advanced military equipment.

The Soviet Union has yet to negotiate a rescheduling of the Indonesian military debt, but the arrival in Djakarta this week of a Soviet trade mission, headed by Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Kuzmin, may indicate a Soviet willingness to discuss this problem.

From the Soviet point of view Malinovsky's visit was some-what overshadowed by the impending visit of Chinese Communist Chief of State Liu Shao Chi and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, and

this concern was reportedly
voiced to Sukarno prior to Mali-
novsky's arrival.

Malinovsky, who was an official guest invited by the Indonesian chief of staff, was provided with a mere colonel as escort officer while he toured the country. His final interview with Sukarno, which was scheduled to last an hour, was terminated in fifteen minutes


The briefness of this talk resulted in Malinovsky's arriving at the airport before the expected crowds had gathered, and the atmosphere there was decidedly cool. Malinovsky failed to hold a press conference or issue a communique, both of which were scheduled.

Following his Indonesian visit, Malinovsky spent a week in Burma, two days of which were devoted to informal talks with General Ne Win. While there is no evidence that a military assistance agreement was reached, the Burmese request for US jet fighters is still outstanding and the Soviet Union probably would agree to a request for military credits for aircraft or arms.

25X1

25X1

25X1



25X1

Asia-Africa

25X1

CRISIS ATMOSPHERE PERSISTS IN LAOS

Pending negotiations under Premier Souvanna's auspices for ending the crisis in Laos face serious obstacles, and the situation could deteriorate rapidly into broad hostilities. The confrontation between neutralist Kong Le's forces and a dissident neutralist faction supported by the Pathet Lao has steadily assumed larger dimensions, in terms both of political and military elements involved and of the area affected. In the immediately critical area of the Plaine des Jarres, the partial truce obtained by Souvanna on his visit there on 14 April has been broken by repeated clashes, highlighted by neutralist loss of Ban Ban to the Communists on 17 April.

These developments have set in motion a major shift in the power structure of the Laotian coalition apparatus. The tendency for hard-pressed neutralist garrisons and rightist military elements of the Lao army and Meo guerrilla force to act in unison has reached a point where General Phoumi claims that Kong Le actually operates under his command. Several battalions of rightist forces are being deployed to the Plaine des Jarres area to backstop Kong Le's base headquarters, and Lao army units are operating with neutralist forces in such widely separated areas as Vang Vieng, Tha Thom, and Nhommarath.

Kong Le's morale has been bolstered by this growing support. Given his tough attitude and lack of faith in Souvanna's determination to restore the status quo ante through negotiations with the Pathet Lao, he may be tempted to try to retake his lost positions by force.

Statements from Hanoi and Peiping and a Moscow rebroadcast of Peiping's statement echo Pathet Lao warnings that the intrusion of US-dominated "reactionary" forces into liberated territory threatens to "rekindle civil war." However, such statements of concern--including speculation that intervention by the Geneva Conference cochairmen (Britain and the USSR) might become necessary--are not matched by diplomatic action. The Soviet ambassador in Vientiane, while adopting a cooperative attitude, is not vigorously supporting Souvanna's proposal that International Control Commission (ICC) teams be stationed temporarily in the Plaine des Jarres; the Polish ICC member appears to be dragging his feet.

25X1

____.

25X1

SECRET

